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Rethinking ‘Flexibilities’ in the International Drug Control System – Potential, 
Precedents and Models for Reforms: 
 
 
John Collins1 
 
Abstract 
Background: 
Much international drug policy debate centres on, what policies are permissible 
under the international drug treaties, whether member states are openly ‘breaching’ 
these treaties by changing national regulatory frameworks and shifting priorities 
away from a ‘war on drugs’ approach, and what ‘flexibility’ exists for policy reform 
and experimentation at national and local levels. Orthodox interpretations hold that 
the current system is a US-led ‘prohibition regime’ that was constructed in an 
extremely repressive and restrictive manner with almost no flexibility for significant 
national deviations. This paper challenges these orthodox interpretive frameworks 
and suggests no absolute and clear dichotomy between strict adherence and 
‘breaches’ of the international treaties.  
 
Methods 
This paper uses historical analysis to highlight the flaws in orthodox policy analyses, 
which assume a uniform interpretation, implementation and set of policy 
trajectories towards a ‘prohibition regime’ in the 20th century. It challenges some 
existing legal interpretations of the treaties through recourse to historical 
precedents of flexible interpretation and policy prioritisation. It then examines the 
legal justifications currently being formulated by member states to explain a shift 
towards policies which, until recently, have been viewed as outside the permissible 
scope of the conventions. It then examines a functionalist framework for 
understanding the likely contours of drug diplomacy in the post-UN General 
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 2016 era. 
 
Results: 
The paper highlights that, contrary to current policy discourses, the international 
control system has always been implemented in a ‘flexible’ manner. It demonstrates 
that drug control goals were repeatedly subsumed to security, development, 
political stability and population welfare imperatives, or what we might now refer to 
under the umbrella of ‘development issues.’ The paper further demonstrates that 
policy prioritisation, inherent treaty ambiguities and complexities as well as the 
recognition of broader issues of security and development were just some of the 
ways in which member states have flexibly implemented the treaties over the last 
century. This has frequently occurred in spite of apparent contradictions between 
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national policies and reigning interpretations of international drug control 
obligations.  
 
Conclusion: 
UNGASS 2016 inaugurated a new era based on an evolving understanding of the UN 
drug control system. In this ‘post-‘war on drugs’ era’, national and local policy 
choices will increasingly hold greater relevance than international ones. Further, 
based on numerous historical precedents, international legal interpretations will 
likely continue to evolve and serve a reactive functional role in providing the formal 
scope to justify national and local deviations from past global norms. These shifting 
interpretations are, and will continue to be, reflected in an interim reliance on treaty 
‘flexibilities’ to explain sustained international cooperation, even as that cooperation 
shifts to an entirely new implementation framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
The failures of the ‘war on drugs’ have been well documented elsewhere (The Global 
Commission on Drug Policy, 2014). Former and sitting presidents throughout Latin 
America to the past President of the United States, his former Attorney General, and 
now the Prime Minister of Canada all openly reject the ‘war on drugs’ in favour of 
new approaches grounded in public health and policy alternatives including legal 
regulation of cannabis. Director of the US Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP), Michael Botticelli, recently described the war on drugs as ‘all wrong’ 
(Pelley, 2015). 
 
The UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs (UNGASS) convened in New York 
City in April 2016 to consider all aspects of the international drug control strategy. 
This paper will argue that the meeting inaugurated the end point of the global ‘war 
on drugs’ era, an and that dates from the declaration of the ‘war on drugs’ in 1971, 
to the UNGASS in 2016. The key questions remain, how to reform national and 
international approaches to drugs, where to direct scarce resources, how to 
translate evidence into policy, and what policies to replace the ‘war on drugs’ 
strategy with. While a wholesale change in national regulatory structures, let alone 
international ones, seems far off, incremental shifts have begun and look likely to 
pick up steam. In this new era, the ‘post-war on drugs era’ national and local spheres 
increasingly hold greater relevance than international ones in determining policy 
choices and outcomes.  
 
At the international level this is reflected in greater reliance on treaty ‘flexibilities’ to 
sustain international cooperation, even if that cooperation occurs on an entirely new 
implementation framework. The term ‘flexibility’ appeared in the official UNGASS 
‘outcome document.’ Some commentators interpret ‘treaty flexibilities’ as public 
health oriented approaches grudgingly permitted within the treaties but against 
their prohibitionist intent (Martin Jelsma & David Bewley-Taylor, 2016). This paper 
rejects this reading and construes flexibilities as implementations which were 
previously viewed as outside mainstream interpretations of the treaties during the 
‘war on drugs’ era but are now increasingly accepted, for example the U.S. State 
Department’s rationale for selective federal enforcement of cannabis prohibitions: 
see (William R. Brownfield, 2014). 
 
Meanwhile, Some reject flexibilities as a ‘cop out’ to avoid rewriting the treaties, or 
claim flexibilities on drug treaties represent a threat to international law (Reinl, 
2016). This paper rejects both of these arguments, highlighting that the history of 
UN drug control is poorly understood, the certainty and clarity of domestic 
obligations of the treaties overstated, and the obligation to pursue policies which we 
equate with the ‘war on drugs’ largely non-existent. This paper argues that selective 
enforcement, policy prioritisation, wide national regulatory variations, and 
purposefully undefined criteria for ‘medical and scientific’ use (Thoumi, 2016) all 
represent ingrained interpretive room within the conventions, magnified by an 
absence of any tangible treaty enforcement mechanisms. 
 
This paper begins by highlighting that the treaties themselves do not constitute a 
‘prohibition regime’ mandating a ‘war on drugs.’ It examines the latest historical 
research regarding the construction, ‘purpose’ and implementation of the 
conventions to highlight the inherent ‘flexibilities’ within them. It explains how that 
the treaties represent a relatively loose international trade regulatory framework 
and that, like all regulatory frameworks, they suggest permitted and non-permitted 
(or prohibited) practices. It argues that an extreme focus on tackling certain types of 
behaviours from the 1970s onwards produced the modern ‘war on drugs’ – but it is 
far from a direct by-product of the UN drug conventions (Collins, 2015). 
 
It then proceeds to offer concrete historical examples from the twentieth century 
highlighting that drug control goals were repeatedly subsumed to security, 
development, political stability and population welfare imperatives, or what we 
might now refer to under the umbrella of ‘development issues.’ Finally, this paper 
examines new interpretive frameworks that emerged during the UNGASS debates to 
enable the transition to a ‘post-war on drugs era’ which build on convention 
‘flexibilities’ to enable policy experimentation. It suggests that multilateralism will 
adapt to provide a functional cooperative framework to help member states (the 
executors of the treaties) to manage this issue, mitigate cross-border spill-overs, 
forward evidence-based drug policies, and openly challenge practices unjustified by 
evidence and banned by existing human rights law.  
 
 
Adding Historical Texture to Interpretive Orthodoxy: Understanding the ‘Purpose’ 
and Implementation of the Conventions: 
In contemporary policy discourse the conventions are frequently described in terms 
of absolute mandates towards prohibition. Further, they are almost universally 
viewed as a US policy export. It is, as is often repeated, a ‘prohibition regime’ 
advocating a clear set of prohibitionist principles originated and driven by US 
zealotry (Jelsma & Bewley-Taylor, 2012). The treaties are, as some have put it: 
‘fundamentally about prohibition’ and the US acted as their enforcer.2 The treaties, 
it is inferred, mandate unconstrained and symmetrical enforcement around 
preventing the non-medical and non-scientific use of certain substances.  
 
This interpretation usually begins with the current policy framework as the logical 
outcome of the treaties and thereby reads the history backwards from the current 
approach. The treaties preceded the war on drugs and therefore must have 
mandated it. Further, in the absence of legal clarity within the documents their 
‘prohibitionist’ intent is often used to infer an obligation to repressive policies in 
legal analyses.3 
 
One could think of an analogy around prohibitions around intellectual property laws. 
International regulations (and prohibitions) on intellectual property theft would 
never be read as carte blanche for extreme policing and human rights degrading 
responses to those involved. Similar comparisons could be made for piracy, whereby 
a policy decision to enact an aggressive and grossly disproportionate military 
response in all cases is somehow construed as a requirement of international law. 
Such a logical fallacy is readily apparent in this case, but seems lost in drug policy 
discussions.  
 
A clear example is visible in legal analyses of the system of ‘Scheduling’, an 
international regulatory mechanism which seeks to outline national controls for 
drugs based on their apparent harms. In the case of Schedule IV, seemingly the most 
stringent schedule of control, a recent overview of Cannabis controls by Bewley-
Taylor, Jelsma and Kramer point to ‘[International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)] 
training materials’’, suggesting the use of those substances “must be prohibited 
except for scientific and very limited medical purposes.”’(Bewley-Taylor, Jelsma, & 
Blickman, 2014, p. 25). However, the historical reality is far less absolute. As 
Historian William McAllister writes,  
 
‘the entire system is built around the concept of supply control, not, it should 
be emphasised, the oftused ‘prohibition’. No drugs are absolutely proscribed 
by the international treaties (although Schedule IV of the Single Convention 
enumerates a short list of substances that governments have the option to 
ban). 
 
In other words, selective historicising and interpretation of the ‘intent’ of the 
treaties results in meaning and obligations being imposed onto documents that 
were in fact written to be highly flexible. For example, as the Commentary on the 
Single Convention of 1961, the legal bedrock of the modern control system, 
explicitly highlights, a core definition within the drug control lexicon ‘the term 
‘medical purposes’ does not necessarily have exactly the same meaning at all 
times and under all circumstances’ and is therefore open to national 
interpretation (United Nations, 1973). 
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Meanwhile a shift in recent historiography highlights that the US’s role in the 
system’s genesis is vastly overstated, particularly with regard to the Single 
Convention of 1961. It is a truism of contemporary drug policy discourse that the 
‘prohibitionist’ US imposed the UN treaties. However, the historiography is 
absolutely clear that the US rejected the framework outlined in the Single 
Convention as too weak and a threat to global health and welfare. Most 
importantly, the Single Convention allowed for the regulation of international 
supplies of pain medicines, but provided no mechanism for shrinking them, other 
than mild dissuasion – for example, self-reporting exports to the INCB. The U.S. 
instead pushed for the stalled and widely unpopular 1953 Opium Protocol which 
would have limited the production and export of opiates to a global oligopoly of 
countries.  
 
The U.S. delegation pointed out that the Single Convention was based on ‘an entirely 
different concept’ of production limitation than the 1953 Protocol. The Single 
Convention, they wrote, contained: ‘a compromise provision resulting from the 
insistence of the Soviet Bloc, countries in the British Commonwealth, and some 
African countries that the new countries be permitted to produce and export opium 
if they so desire’ (Collins, 2015, p. 250). As a result, one major U.S. press source 
described the Single Convention as a ‘Soviet plot’ to flood the world with opium 
(Collins, 2015, p. 254). 
 
The Single Convention came into force in 1964. However, it was not until 1967 that 
the State Department shifted policy and drove its ratification through the Senate. As 
McAllister highlights, it is hard to understate lead US drug diplomat Harry 
Anslinger’s ‘antipathy to the Single Convention, nor to what extremes he would 
go to defeat it’ (McAllister, 2000, p. 215). The fact that the treaty survived 
Anslinger’s onslaught merely highlights the broad international buy-in to the 
global regulatory system outlined in the Single Convention, included by key 
states such as the UK (Collins, 2015).  
 
Other recent historical works should galvanise the move beyond the ‘US-led, 
prohibition regime’ narrative and new analyses of global drug regulatory efforts 
as a complex system with many determinants. For example, Jim Mills recently 
challenged the genesis narrative around the Hague Convention of 1912 by 
highlighting Britain as a regulatory activist state, particularly regarding cocaine, 
and not merely a reluctant passive actor as previous analyses had suggested. He 
argues that there is an ‘[i]mportance of returning to the details of British 
participation in the emergence of the international drugs regulatory system…to 
get a clearer and more nuanced picture of what they sought to achieve and why’ 
(Mills, 2014, p. 16). Meanwhile, James Windle has correctly highlighted that the 
‘concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is…flawed’ and 
points to the genesis of the idea is Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Windle, 2013, p. 1). Isaac Campos makes a similar case about Mexico 
arguing that ‘the problem is that historians simply have not looked deeply at the 
origins of drug prohibition in Latin America’ (Campos, 2012, p. 4).  
 
Similarly, the work of Collins argues that the entire regulatory structure of the 
system is misunderstood by the fixation on prohibitions. He argues that the 
system is not a ‘prohibition regime’, but a system of international commodity 
regulation with (like all regulatory systems) prohibitionist aspects. By policy 
analyses focusing on the prohibitionist aspects the entire functional regulatory 
‘core’ of the conventions is missed along with a genuine understanding of 
national interests in sustaining the system, even if in an evolved, more ‘flexible’, 
form (Collins, 2015). 
 
One conclusion from these analyses is that the ‘limits of latitude’ are not in any 
way clearly examined and may, as recent analysis by Francisco Thoumi has 
shown, be impossible to define given logical inconsistencies within the 
Conventions (see below). Current understandings of the legal limits of the 
conventions are explicitly based on historical analyses now recognised as weak, 
questionable or inaccurate. The current policy orthodoxy of ‘limits’ takes the 
current interpretive framework at face value and extrapolates a clear division 
between policies which are allowed and those which ‘breach’ the ‘prohibitionist’ 
goals of the treaties (For an example of the “limits” orthodoxy see: Jelsma & 
Bewley-Taylor, 2012). 
 
Under this orthodoxy, states which deviate from this ‘prohibitionist’ approach, the 
Swiss, the Dutch, Uruguay, now the US, Bolivia and others which avoid the flashlight 
of international attention4 are regarded as aberrations or ‘defections’ from the clear 
intent of the conventions. A refined form of this analysis has sought to categorise 
how public health approaches represent a form of ‘soft defection’ from the ‘regime’, 
while overt breaks with the ‘consensus’ represent ‘hard defections’: (Bewley-Taylor, 
2012). This establishes a clear dichotomy, between strict treaty adherents and those 
defecting from, or ‘breaching,’ the treaties. This dichotomy is then used to argue for 
the necessity of treaty rewriting since the irrational and illegitimate, US-imposed 
‘prohibitionist’ system is bound to unravel towards a new and evolved system once 
its hegemon loses control. 
 
The following examples, far from exhaustive, intend to highlight that instead of a 
clear dichotomy between adherence and ‘breach,’ implementation has always 
ranged on a broad spectrum. This implementation was determined by resource 
constraints, local economic development, security policies, political stability and 
geopolitics. As one UK diplomatic brief in 1951 highlighted, parts of the drug 
conventions had frequently ‘been more honoured in the breach than in the 
observance.’5  
 
Nevertheless, as a more functionalist-oriented interpretative framework would 
suggest, the conventions have traditionally been viewed as a useful coalescing 
mechanism for international cooperation and therefore deserving public 
declamations of respect and adherence. Legal accommodations (what we today 
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5
 Draft Brief for UK Rep, ‘ECOSOC XII’, 6th February 1951, BNA, IOC (51)14, CAB 134/410. 
might call ‘flexibilities’) have been a common part of the international discourse, and 
generally accepted provided they sustained a sense of coherent international 
management of the issue. Discussions of ‘quasi-medical’ opium use, contingency of 
suppression on action in surrounding territories, the need for development-first 
approaches in vulnerable regions and shifts in types of ambulatory ‘maintenance’ 
permitted represent some of the clearest examples of these evolving interpretive 
and implementation frameworks throughout the last century (See: Collins, 2015, pp. 
38–100). It is towards these examples we now turn. 
 
Regulations over Prohibitions: 
Far from a system focused on ‘prohibition,’ prior to the ‘war on drugs’ era, 
prohibitions represented one (relatively minor) aspect of a broader international 
regulatory and trading arrangement. The vast majority of diplomatic fuel from 1924-
1971, when the modern treaty system evolved, was burned on developing 
international trade regulations, particularly around the contentious issue of 
production controls. The U.S. favoured a strict oligopoly of producers based on 
quotas, while other powerful drug manufacturing states preferred a relatively free 
market to keep opium prices low (McAllister, 2000). 
 
Prohibitionist aspects of international treaties, for example against state sanctioned 
opium smoking or problematic cultivation, were of secondary interest to most 
states. Many, the UK for example, thought the latter unsolvable and held much 
‘sympathy for the raw [opium] producing countries’ (Collins, 2015, p. 183). They 
merely sought to enshrine market protections for their pharmaceutical firms and 
their healthcare sector in treaty law. Further, when the conventions were 
formulated, European countries had extremely low levels of domestic consumption. 
They viewed a well-regulated international trade as the best mechanism to keep 
consumption low and undermine the illicit market. Under this trajectory of supply 
management, international provisions around managing consumption were 
generally sidestepped or kept as relatively unobtrusive as possible (McAllister, 2012). 
Again, as one UK diplomat wrote, British public opinion, ‘little excited by a drugs 
menace, would not favour extravagant local penalties to meet a world problem’ 
(Collins, 2015, p. 200).  
 
Prioritising Policies: Development, Security and Welfare First: 
When international obligations pushed against preferred regulatory policies, the 
latter were generally continued regardless of the treaties by referring to mitigating 
factors. The 1912 and 1925 conventions suggested prohibitions on opium smoking 
and accompanying production in Asia. However, the imperial powers in pre- and 
post-World War II Asia largely refused to implement them because state structures 
were too weak to do so, medical systems - let alone treatment services - were non-
existent, and because it would simply fuel an already large regional illicit market 
(Collins, 2015, pp. 38–100).  
 
Instead, the focus of colonial governments was to regulate existing consumption via 
monopolies and maintenance. They could then aim towards a time when 
prohibitions would be feasible and not produce more harm than good (Collins, 2015, 
p. 51). For example, many of the monopolies enacted registration and rationing 
systems and in many areas the core focus of opium policy was merely to make 
government opium more competitive than illicit opium. The goal was, first and 
foremost, do no policy harm and second to lessen the harms of the regional illicit 
markets. Blind adherence to international policy agendas forwarded by, what one 
British medical official called ‘statistics-bound opiophobes’ and ‘anti-opium 
propagandists,’ ‘would be foolish as well as wrong’ if it didn’t take account of local 
realities (Collins, 2015, p. 84). 
  
The Dutch and British, in particular, focused their diplomatic efforts on creating a 
fully regulated global licit market (see below) to undermine the illicit one. If this 
could be shown to demonstrably suppress the illicit market and make prohibitions 
more realistic in the longer run the latter would then be countenanced. Even then, 
however, they insisted on ‘a reasonable transitional period’ to shift away from 
certain types of consumption regardless of the terms set by the international drug 
treaties (Collins, 2015, p. 51).  Prohibitions on certain types of use could be viewed 
as end goals but only if a whole array of development and governance outcomes 
were secured first (Collins, 2015, p. 87). 
 
Quiet bilateral pressure from the U.S. eventually pushed the UK to officially end 
government supplies of smoking opium to registered users in most colonies at the 
end of World War II (Collins, Forthcoming). However, in many cases, local policies 
remained unchanged or the form of government ‘maintenance’ changed. For 
example, the Colonial Office merely switched to providing a pill of opium form as this 
was seen as more in line with conceptions of ‘medical and scientific’ use of the day 
(Collins, 2015, p. 148). Yet, as political unrest continued in Malaya through the late-
1940s, they consciously avoided enforcing pointless prohibitions on smoking opium 
and deflected attention by once again highlighting illicit trafficking in the region as a 
mitigating factor (Collins, 2015, p. 196). The UK also steadfastly refused to 
implement immediate prohibitions in Burma after World War II, despite intense U.S. 
pressure (Collins, 2015, p. 98). Similarly, in 1945 the French government announced 
a policy of prohibition in their colonies (McAllister, 2000, p. 152). However, fears of 
social unrest and inability to implement prohibitions meant that highland groups 
were exempted and an unofficial opium monopoly continued (Windle, 2012, p. 427). 
 
The U.S. itself was extremely selective on enforcement. It was happy to pressure 
states to implement prohibition, but would ignore them the moment broader 
geopolitical interests intervened. For example, although the US was ostensibly 
pushing Iran to limit opium production after World War II, embassy officials in 
Tehran, bucking against congressional pressure, cited ‘patent instability’ and refused 
to lobby for measures against opium production until stability returned (Collins, 
2015, p. 154). In the 1940s and 1950s the US ignored high levels of opium smuggling 
from Kuomintang insurgents in Burma (McCoy, 2003). Further, the State Department 
ensured the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs overlooked continued opium 
smoking in French Indochina pointing out that ‘the political situation in that part of 
the world and in France’ prevented it and suggested ‘non-public corrective action’ 
(Collins, 2015, p. 181). Similarly, in 1948 the State Department vetoed any criticism 
of perceived Mexican inaction of opium growing citing ‘other negotiations…in 
several matters of considerable importance, one of which is of great importance to 
us from the viewpoint of hemisphere defence’, (Collins, 2015, p. 171). 
 
What these and numerous other examples show is that drug issues were almost 
never read in isolation of broader health, welfare, development and security targets, 
and rarely as absolute obligations to institute un-sequenced and self-defeating 
policies.  
 
 
A Clearer Understanding of the UN as a Normative Actor: 
The UN is frequently referred to as the ‘policemen’ of global prohibition, a 
characterisation that obscures a more complex and less monolithic reality. The UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs is effectively a democratic forum populated by 
member states. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is not a UN body - 
it has a role in assisting member states in treaty implementation and highlighting 
concerns to CND, but little room for autonomous enforcement. The drug secretariat 
(currently UNODC) exists to facilitate CND and member state policies. The 
Secretariat has played a role in advocating repressive policies and setting national 
policy trajectories towards the ‘war on drugs.’ However, this arose through agenda 
setting, policy dissemination and nudging towards repressive policies by suggesting 
they were based in best-practice evidence.  
 
For example, the UN drug secretariat was instrumental in shaping the international 
narrative around managing consumption. This normative framework was established 
by a questionnaire circulated to member states in March 1947. Independent of any 
treaty obligations, questions were designed to suggest repressive and strict 
measures as the natural response, such as asking whether provision had been made 
to isolate drug ‘addicts’ from the rest of the population (Collins, 2015, p. 172). States 
began vying to outdo each other at CND in highlighting the severity of control and 
punishment. Soon the arrest of ‘addicts,’ overprescribing doctors, illicit traffickers 
and other narcotics laws violators were viewed as metrics of success in international 
control (Collins, 2015, p. 172).  
 
The implication is that these were policy trajectories and choices, to which treaty 
debates have little key relevance. Member states can, just as they rolled towards 
these policies, roll back from them. UNODC, just as its predecessors painted 
repression as the policy du-jour, can now highlight more effective policies in its 
place. Meanwhile, as already discussed, the obligations, architecture and authorship 
of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs are widely misunderstood. It was a 
consolidation of existing treaties with some minor advances, such as defining the 
parameters of supply regulation and suggesting further prohibitions on types of non-
medical and non-scientific use (while leaving these terms undefined (Thoumi, 2016)). 
 
Later conventions like the 1971 and the 1988 were additions to the regulatory 
framework but provided little that was radically new. The 1971 Convention was an 
even looser regulatory framework than the Single Convention and was written with 
the drug industry, while the 1988 Convention was written in terms of the 1961 
Convention’s regulatory framework (Collins, 2012). These conventions and relevant 
international bodies provided a useful enabling mechanism to coalesce member 
states around, while growing drug consumption in traditionally recalcitrant regions 
like Europe helped ensure the proliferation of repressive prohibitionist national 
models (McAllister, 2000). A global regulatory framework matured alongside and 
was co-opted by the ‘war on drugs,’ but it was not a determining factor. 
 
Understanding the Licit Global Market: 
From 1909-1967 a global regulatory system was created at the international level to 
manage the flows of ‘dangerous drugs.’ It was a system of trade regulation – not a 
system of global prohibition. Like all regulatory systems it created a distinction 
between ‘licit’ activities and ‘illicit’ activities. The former centred on undefined 
‘medical and scientific’ use of ‘scheduled’ substances, while the latter centred on 
undefined forms of non-medical and non-scientific use and diversion. The overall 
goal was to create a ‘planned’ international market (Renborg, 1964) with demand 
being predicted by industry and governments and supply being determined by a 
central bureaucratic group of number crunchers – what became INCB – while 
transactions would be left to the market. 
 
The assumption of the system’s architects was that a functioning regulatory system 
would absorb most licit production, shrink the illicit market and thereby help lessen 
non-medical and non-scientific consumption. What would remain would be a 
minimal role for enforcement activities (Meyer & Parssinen, 2002). These 
assumptions proved misplaced as drug consumption grew rapidly in the 1960s 
onwards and with it the global illicit market. Further, the adoption of a westernised 
conception of ‘medical and scientific’ consumption consigned large swathes of 
traditional medical use to the illicit market and with it the regions where it was 
present. Simultaneously, those advocating a police oriented and repressive and 
militarised approach gained prominence and eventually instigated the ‘war on drugs’ 
of the 1970s – 2000s. However, by 2008 it was clear that this approach was not 
working and member states began to openly question the consensus. It is towards 
this period we now turn. 
 
Lessons from The Recent History of UNGASS, 2008-2016 – the Emergence of 
‘flexibilities’: 
In 2008, amidst carnage in Mexico and a recognition of the mass incarceration crisis 
in the US, a shift in global drug policies became apparent. For the first time in 
decades, new approaches outside the ‘war on drugs’ strategy were countenanced. 
Tentative discussions gave way to open debate. By October 2012 President Juan 
Manuel Santos of Colombia called for a systematic rethink of global drug policies 
arguing that: 
 
‘The time has come to think outside the box. Our invitation is to dutifully 
study new formulas and approaches screened through an academic, scientific 
and non-politicised lens, because this war has proven to be extremely 
challenging and oftentimes, highly frustrating.’(Santos, 2012) 
 
By June 2013, a coherent reform bloc had emerged in the Americas under the 
leadership of Mexico, Colombia and Guatemala. At the height of global reform 
rhetoric, even the UN Secretary General called for ‘a wide-ranging and open debate 
that considers all options’ (Ban Ki-moon, 2013).  
 
Reform-minded civil society was encouraged and hoped for a full ranging debate 
which would break open the holy grain of global drug policy: rewriting the UN Drug 
Conventions (Martin Jelsma & David Bewley-Taylor, 2016). Some member states 
appeared willing to push a hard-line reform agenda and the idea of written treaty 
reforms was quietly countenanced. However, member states soon faced a choice: 
shift policies by (1) circumventing the conventions or (2) engaging in a monumental 
diplomatic process that risked rupturing the global control system and other issues, 
linked via byzantine international institutional structures and politics.  
 
The tendency towards option (1) was only reinforced when one or more of the 
following factors seemed present:  
 
1. If the system could be reformed by de facto rather than de jure means;  
2. If the system could serve as a mechanism to readjust regional 
institutional alignments for a variety of issues by exploiting drugs as a 
geopolitical wedge issue;  
3. If wavering adherence to the control system could add new pressure for 
additional resources from interested states such as the US to tackle issues 
seen as important to producer and transit countries. 
 
Meanwhile, governmental views on drug treaty issue were summed up by one 
senior Latin American political leader in 2014: ‘we examined the treaties closely and 
concluded there is nothing in them which requires a ‘war on drugs’.’6 While many 
observers continued to argue normative, legal and moral imperatives for treaty 
rewriting, pragmatism seemed increasingly absent. Latin American governments, 
while leading the debate, appear to have done so for a variety of reasons including: 
geopolitics, national self-interest, diplomatic manoeuvring, pragmatism, a desire to 
pursue effective and evidence-based policies and other idiosyncrasies. When some 
of these factors began to shift or results were unclear, their willingness to bear the 
resource and time burdens of endless diplomatic processes waned.  
 
The U.S., on the other hand simply shifted their interpretation of the international 
treaties after several states moved towards cannabis legalisation. Further, in 
moments of bluntness, State Department officials have openly asserted national 
sovereignty tempered by a need to defuse international criticisms (Centre for 
International and Strategic Studies, 2015). Conservative actors within the control 
system, most notably the diplomatically inept President of INCB (a treaty body with a 
poor human rights record (Csete, 2012)), Raymond Yans, sparked ire by publicly 
                                                        
6
 Private discussions at LSE. 
castigating Uruguay for legalising cannabis while seeming to avoid direct 
confrontation with the U.S. (Buenos Aires Herald.Com, 2013). 
 
Simultaneously, a number of other ‘flexibility frameworks’ emerged to deflate the 
conventions as an obstacle to reform. Europe, while expressing discomfort with 
overtly highlighting international legal instruments as ‘flexible,’ preferred to speak of 
interpretive ‘scope,’ downplay the debate and keep it off their already packed policy 
agenda. Asia, meanwhile, sought a path of ‘steady as she goes’ on the ‘war on 
drugs,’ with ASEAN nations continuing the ‘drug free world’ pursuit (ASEAN, 2012). 
Russia, pursuing the maxim of ‘offence is the best defence,’ grappled with building 
repressive coalitions around anti-public health policies – for example an anti-
methadone coalition (Helena Forrester, 2015) – and pushing a hard-line on opium 
production in Afghanistan. The obstacles to creating a new ‘consensus’ across these 
diverse blocs on this divisive issue unsurprisingly proved insurmountable. 
 
The UN stepped in to take clearer control of the negotiating reins. Soon the UNGASS 
process became bogged down in consensus building and the reform impetus stalled. 
By mid-late 2015 expectations for the UNGASS meeting reached rock bottom. Some 
looked to 2019 as the ‘next big step’ where true UN reforms could be enacted. 
Others looked outside the system. As one senior Latin American official stated in a 
private roundtable: ‘the current system does not work for us and we cannot wait for 
it to change.’7  
 
The US solidified a national discourse around treatment and ‘recovery’ and focused 
on transmitting that narrative to the international level. Marijuana legalisation had 
become a sovereign issue and generally remained far from official UN discourses. A 
new consensus around public health, access to medicines and the need for human 
rights pervaded diplomatic language, but it was clear the international system had 
moved as far as was likely in a relatively short period. Some stasis was certain to 
follow UNGASS.  
 
As the ‘outcome document’ materialised and the likely contours of UNGASS became 
impossibly clear, some civil society sought to unilaterally veto the process (Jelsma, 
2016), but the dye was cast. Member states had burned significant diplomatic 
resources. Those at the vanguard initially sought to distance themselves from the 
outcome, but soon began to highlight the document as a major step forward, 
enabling an expansion of national experimentation through new treaty flexibilities. 
Others soon began to highlight it as a human rights win (Lines & Barrett, 2016).  
 
In the years 2008-16 the UN served as a useful forum for driving a change in the 
normative underpinnings of global drug policies. By exposing the contradictions 
between the UN’s approach to drug policy and broader approaches to human rights, 
development and public health (most notably in the field of HIV), significant 
rhetorical and policy shifts occurred. These changes have been internalised by CND, 
UNODC and its corresponding bodies (United Nations General Assembly, 2016). This 
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percolated down to member states, many of whom more openly laud human rights 
and public health policies. However, while governments have absorbed the language 
of reform, they have generally avoided major shifts in budgets and policies. To tackle 
this latter issue now requires a shift beyond international forums and a greater focus 
on changing national and regional funding and policy goals. 
 
Policy Experimentation in a Changed International Environment: 
As US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, Ambassador William Brownfield stated: ‘Things have changed 
since 1961. We must have enough flexibility to allow us to incorporate those 
changes into our policies … to tolerate different national drug policies, to accept the 
fact that some countries will have very strict drug approaches; other countries will 
legalise entire categories of drugs’ (William R. Brownfield, 2014). 
 
There is no single mechanism to define the boundaries of the treaties. Member 
states must instead decide whether the national regulatory systems they enact 
remain ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning’ of the treaties, as 
mandated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Art. 31, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). 
 
Meanwhile, as Mark Kleiman and Jeremy Ziskind note: ‘The places that legalise 
cannabis first will provide – at some risk to their own populations – an external 
benefit to the rest of the world in the form of knowledge, however the experiments 
turn out…[t]he guardians of the international treaty regimes would be well advised 
to keep their hands off as long as the pioneering jurisdictions take adequate 
measures to prevent ‘exports’’ (Mark A.R. Kleiman & Jeremy A. Ziskind, 2014).  
 
Frameworks for Flexibilities: 
 
1) Resource/Capacity Limitations: Selective Enforcement Model: 
This framework derives from legal complications around enforcing the treaties in a 
federal political system. The U.S. remains the test case. The federal government is 
the signatory to the UN drug control treaties and is their executor. Individual U.S. 
states are not. The federal government has no constitutional authority to force 
states to implement the treaties. The federal government only has the authority to 
directly enforce the treaties in states via federal resources.  
 
The U.S. State Department has argued this would place an excessive burden on 
federal resources and is therefore not consonant with a realistic interpretation of 
the drug control treaties. Further, the drug control treaties make repeated and 
specific mention of ‘constitutional limitations’ as a mitigating factor around 
implementing a number of their clauses. For example, Article 35 of the 1961 Single 
Convention includes the preface: ‘Having due regard to their constitutional, legal and 
administrative systems the Parties shall…’(Art. 35, Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961) 
 
The US State Department has gone further and suggested a four-point framework 
for continuing international cooperation on drug policy, whilst allowing increasing 
variation in national policies (William R. Brownfield, 2014): 
 
1) Defend the integrity of the core8 of the conventions. 
2) Allow flexible interpretation of treaties. 
3) Allow different national/regional strategies. 
4) Tackle organised crime. 
 
 
Other federalist jurisdictions have faced similar issues. In the case of Spain, a 2013 
report by RAND highlights that:  
 
‘Following several Supreme Court rulings, the possession and consumption of 
cannabis is no longer considered a criminal offence, and the jurisprudence in the 
field has tended to interpret the existing legislation in a way that permits ‘shared 
consumption’ and cultivation for personal use when grown in a private place. 
While there is no additional legislation or regulation defining the scale or 
particulars under which cultivation could be permitted, the Cannabis Social Club 
(CSC) movement has sought to explore this legal space, reasoning that if one is 
allowed to cultivate cannabis for personal use and if ‘shared consumption’ is 
allowed, then one should also be able to do this in a collective manner. In this 
context, hundreds of CSCs have been established over the past 15 years, but legal 
uncertainty around the issue of production continues.’ (Kilmer, Kruithof, Pardal, 
Caulkins, & Rubin, 2013) 
 
 
2) Supremacy of Human Rights Treaties over Drug Control Treaties: 
Human rights obligations are a part of the UN Charter. Obligations derived from the 
drug control treaties are subordinate to human rights obligations. As the UN Charter 
explicitly states, ‘in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.’(Ch. XVI, Art 103, United Nations Charter, 1945) 
 
Uruguay has provided a systematic elaboration of this argument. The Uruguayan 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 
in February 2014:  
  
‘The Uruguayan State is an absolute defender of international law. In that 
sense, it has a comprehensive view of the law and obligations assumed by the 
country not only in the sphere of the Drug Conventions of 1961, 1971 and 
1988, but also in the field of the protection of human rights… 
  
It is important for Uruguay to remark the following:  
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(i) The object and purpose of the Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
especially the 1988 Convention, should be combating illicit 
trafficking and, in particular, combating the harmful effects of 
drug trafficking… 
(ii) All the measures adopted to put this combat into practice must 
neither contradict the Uruguayan Constitution nor ignore or leave 
fundamental rights unprotected.  
(iii) The obligations that our State, as well as other State parties, have 
assumed under other Conventions, must be taken into account, in 
particular those related to the protection of human rights, since 
they constitute jus cogens [“compelling law”] and cannot be 
ignored.   
(iv) …given two possible interpretations of the provisions of the 
Convention, the choice should be for the one that best protects the 
human right in question, as stated in Article 29 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights…In this context and on the basis of 
the above interpretation, we believe that production and sale in 
the manner prescribed in the new law may be the best way, on the 
one hand, to combat drug trafficking, and on the other, to defend 
the constitutionally protected right to freedom of our fellow 
citizens.’ (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Uruguay, 2014) 
 
 
3) Expanded Definition of ‘Medical and Scientific’ via Social Scientific Policy 
Experimentation: 
 
As the commentary on the 1961 Single Convention states, ‘The object of the 
international narcotics system is to limit exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes the trade in and use of controlled drugs.’(United Nations, 1973) 
 
The Commentary on the Single Convention states that ‘the term ‘medical purposes’ 
does not necessarily have exactly the same meaning at all times and under all 
circumstances’ (United Nations, 1973). Prior to 1961, an array of states counted 
state regulated opium eating and smoking as ‘quasi-medical’ use (Collins, 2015, p. 
15). Although this has ceased, it highlights the continued evolutionary process of 
convention interpretation. By redefining national understandings of ‘medical and 
scientific’ with greater regard to national needs, indigenous rights and human rights, 
states can expand the scope of licit consumption practices under the conventions. 
This provides significant and innate flexibility of interpretation around 
implementation of the conventions (Thoumi, 2016).  
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
The history of the international system highlights some key insights for reform 
debates: 
1. The term ‘medical and scientific’ use was the treaty delineator between licit 
and illicit practices. However, it was a consistently shifting parameter 
determined by reigning cultural norms. The international control system of 
was a reflection of these norms, not a determinant. In the Single Convention 
the definition of ‘medical and scientific’ use was consciously left to member 
states (United Nations, 1973) to decide alongside broad scopes to 
implement national regulations.  
2. Bilateral political pressure was often the key driver of shifts towards 
prohibitive models of regulation, not any overweening fidelity to a 
prohibitionist reading of the drug conventions. Recourse to bilateral 
pressure was, in-turn, generally determined by, and subservient to, broader 
geopolitical interests. 
3. The conventions, from the very beginning, were read and implemented with 
close regard to local socioeconomic and political realities. This has since 
been extended to include UN human rights regimes which mitigate against 
repressive policies.  
 
 
During the ‘war on drugs’ era, 1971-2016, drug policies became increasingly 
untethered from other policy realities. Many international forums, once bastions of 
the prohibitionist mentality of market eradication and zero tolerance to drug use, 
now openly discuss compassion and public health approaches. The interventions (if 
not the language) of ‘harm reduction’ are increasingly recognised for their efficacy. 
The clear failures of ‘demand reduction’ and ‘supply reduction’ policies militate 
against cheerleading for a continuation of a police-led and militarised strategy 
(Felbab-Brown, 2014). Few still seriously speak of a ‘drug free world.’ Meanwhile, 
emerging regulatory experimentation with recreational drug markets is widely 
viewed as either inevitable (Caulkins, 2016) or a positive empirical social scientific 
experiment (Mark A.R. Kleiman & Jeremy A. Ziskind, 2014). 
 
Meanwhile, myriad political, diplomatic, economic, realpolitik, irrational, moral and 
legion other forces have brought international drug policy to the point it is today. An 
inflection point occurred over the last decade, which drove global drug policies more 
quickly towards a new normative international framework. The complex political and 
economic forces which buttress the system have begun to shift. However, UNGASS 
demonstrates that change will be evolutionary, not transformative; ad hoc, messy 
and legally ambiguous, not clear, coherent and legalistic. This is as one would expect 
with any issue within the realm of international relations. The ‘war on drugs’ has 
always been about interpretation, implementation and resource allocation. The 
escape from the ‘war on drugs’ will similarly rest on interpretation (flexibilities), 
implementation (evidence or ideology) and resource allocation (public health and 
human security over incarceration and policing). This paper has highlighted 
precedents, possibilities and models for multilateralism to adapt to changing global 
realities. 
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